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Abstract 
Paper-based folders have been widely used to 
coordinate cares in medical-social networks, but they 
introduce some burning issues (e.g. privacy 
protection, remote access to the folder). Replacing 
the paper-based folder system by a traditional 
Electronic Healthcare Record (EHR) introduces new 
drawbacks: forcing of the patient consent, unbounded 
data retention, no security guarantee outside the 
server domain and no disconnected access to the 
folder. To solve these problems, this paper proposes 
an experimental platform which combines an EHR 
system with medical-social folders embedded in a 
new hardware portable device. The objectives 
pursued are (1) to re-establish a natural and 
powerful way of protecting and sharing highly 
sensitive information among trusted parties and (2) 
to build a shared medical-social folder providing the 
highest degree of availability, whatever the mode of 
operation (disconnected or not). 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Context of the study 
The ageing of population makes the health 
monitoring of elderly people at home crucial. In this 
context, sensitive data has to be shared between all 
participants of medical-social networks (doctors, 
nurses, social workers, home help and family circle) 
with different access rights. The data must be 
available at the patient’s bedside for a better 
monitoring of their health cares. For this purpose, the 
Yvelines District in France has decided to carry out 
an experimental project of Shared Medical-Social 
Folder, called SMSF (DMSP in French) in the 
following. In the first step, this project targets elderly 
people from two gerontology networks. At mid-term, 
it could be extended to other vulnerable people in 
unstable or handicapped situation. 
ALDS (a home care association) has already 
carried out a “Common Medical Folder” in paper 
format, which enables professionals and participants 
from medical-social sectors to write down crucial 
facts related to the monitoring of elderly people. 
While the day-to-day use of this paper folder has 
proved its efficiency, some burning issues are still 
unresolved: 
• No privacy: all participants (doctors, nurses, social 
workers, home help and family circle) can access to 
the full folder while some patients are facing 
complex human situations (diagnosis of terminal 
illness, addictions, financial difficulties, etc).  
• No remote access to the folder: consequently, the 
folder is not updated consistently and timely, 
leading to a lesser accurate monitoring. 
• No connection with computer-based information 
systems: this implies later multiple keyboarding of 
the same data, an error prone and time waste task. 
 
1.2. Motivation  
During the last decade, several countries launched 
ambitious Electronic Healthcare Record (EHR) 
programs with the objective to increase the quality of 
care while decreasing its cost [4, 5]. The advantage of 
centralizing the information in EHR systems is 
manifold: completeness (i.e., to make the information 
complete and up to date), availability (to make it 
accessible through the internet 24h-7 days a week), 
usability (to organize the data and make it easily to be 
queried and interpreted), consistency (to guarantee 
integrity constraints and enforce atomicity and 
isolation of updates), durability (to protect the data 
against failure) and security (to protect the data 
against illegal accesses). 
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On the other hand, studies in different countries 
[7, 13] shown that patients are reluctant to use EHR 
systems arguing increasing threats on individual 
privacy, whatever the security procedures placed at 
the server. Actually, the patient has the feeling to 
definitively loose the control over his data for the 
following reasons: 
– Forcing of the patient consent: the high number of 
involved people, the diversity of their roles and the 
intrinsic complexity of the medical information force 
the patient to blindly adhere to a predefined access 
control policy that he does not really master. 
Complementary to access control, audit trails can 
help the patient tracking a posteriori who accessed 
which part of his folder and when. However, the 
complexity of auditing increases with the size of the 
trail [3]. With respect to the free expression of the 
patient consent, EHR systems cannot compete with 
the archaic paper-based information sharing. 
– Unbounded data retention: Data retention is a usual 
law principle attaching a lifetime to the data after 
which it must be withdrawn from the system [6]. 
Unfortunately, data retention conflicts with the 
primary objective of an EHR, which is building a 
complete medical history of a patient. In addition, [9] 
highlighted the difficulty to physically destroy data 
stored in existing DBMSs. This reinforces the patient 
feeling that his complete history is recorded forever. 
As a result, the patient may choose not storing some 
information in his folder (synonym of incompleteness 
and lower quality of care).  
– No security guarantee outside the server domain: 
healthcare data is likely to be extracted from the 
server and hosted in a client device (e.g., the doctor’s 
device) for use in a disconnected mode, e.g., to 
provide care at home. Unfortunately, the hosting 
device is much more spyware, Trojan and virus prone 
than the server, introducing a severe security breach 
in the architecture.  
– No disconnected access to the folder: EHR have 
been designed with an on-line usage in mind. Thus, 
the prerequisite for a large category of patients (e.g., 
elderly, disabled and needy people) to get access to 
their folder is either to use a terminal at some public 
place or to own a PC and to pay for an internet 
connection. Otherwise, a practitioner providing care 
at home will have beforehand to download on his 
mobile device the folders of all visited patients, a 
complex and time consuming task, apart the security 
breach mentioned above. 
The motivation of our work is precisely to address 
these four issues. 
1.3. Problem statement 
According to the discussion above, the 
dimensions of the problem tackled by the SMSF 
project are: 
1. Agreement expression: to give back the ability to the 
person to establish a strict, understandable and 
auditable control on how his sensitive data are shared. 
2. Data retention: to give back the management to 
the person for the data retention period, by 
distinguishing the notions of retention and durability. 
3. Security continuity: to guarantee the same security 
level wherever the data is hosted (server or terminal) 
and whatever the manner it is processed (remote or 
offline access). 
4. Disconnected access: to enable disconnected 
accesses to, and modification of, the data while 
guaranteeing eventual data consistency. 
In this paper, we propose a novel organization of 
EHR addressing this problem statement. This 
organization capitalizes on a new hardware device 
called Secure Portable Token (SPT) in the sequel. 
Roughly speaking, an SPT combines a secure 
microcontroller (similar to a smart card chip) with a 
large external Flash memory (Gigabyte sized) on a 
USB key form factor [8]. An SPT can host on-board 
data and run on-board code with proven security 
properties thanks to its tamper-resistant hardware and 
a certified operating system. Embedding a database 
system and a web server in an SPT gives the 
opportunity to manage (part of) a healthcare folder 
outside the EHR server with no loss of security. 
Accessing the on-board folder while being 
disconnected from the network requires a simple 
rendering device equipped with a USB port and 
running a web browser. More, the embedded DBMS 
can be made self-administered so that the patient 
keeps a full control over the on-board data. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces the principles of the solution and illustrates 
them through typical scenarios. Section 3 presents the 
functional architecture. Section 4 sketches important 
technical challenges related the management of 
databases embedded in SPT. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Principles and Scenarios 
2.1. Basic Principles 
We illustrate below how the SPT technology 
complements the traditional EHR system to cope 
with the exposed problems. Each user U owns (1) a 
personal healthcare folder managed by a central 
server and (2) a personalized SPT. This SPT contains 
the numeric certificate of U enabling him a strong 
authentication to the server when he remotely 
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accesses to his folder. This SPT contains also a (total 
or partial) replica of U’s healthcare folder. Finally, 
the SPT contains embedded software components 
(Web server and DBMS) giving offline access to the 
folder through any terminal hosting a USB port and a 
web browser.  
Since U may exchange data with a health 
professional P, these professionals have also to be 
equipped with a personalized SPT. The health 
professional P’s SPT is similar to the one of U on a 
software and hardware point of view, but its role in 
the interactions with U’s folder is particular. P’s SPT 
contains P’s certificate enabling a strong 
authentication to the server, whether it is the central 
server or the server embedded in U’s SPT and 
managing U’s folder. In both cases, P follows the 
access control policy fixed by U, which is the same 
on the central and the embedded server. 
If P accesses to U’s data and decides to replicate it 
on his terminal, for example to have offline access to 
it, the data will be encrypted with a key only known 
by P’s SPT. When P queries the data, the embedded 
DBMS in his SPT accesses and decrypts it to answer 
the query. A similar principle allows U to dump 
encrypted data on the central server in destination of 
P, who will be able to access to it thanks to the 
DBMS and the keys embedded in his SPT (assuming 
the keys have been shared between U’s SPT and P’s 
SPT through a so-called secure channel). The 
difference for U between dumping clear or encrypted 
data on the central server is as follows. In the first 
case (clear data), data sharing is controlled by the 
access control policy that U consented to. In the 
second case (encrypted data), the access control 
policy is strengthened by an obligation of physically 
sharing the encryption keys, and this sharing is 
managed totally under the control of U. 
To organize the sharing, user U can choose 
different status for his data: 
o Regular data: regular data is replicated on the 
central server and the SPT, protected by the same 
access control policy. The motivation to replicate 
regular data in the embedded folder is to assure 
their offline availability. 
o Secret data: secret data is exclusively stored on 
U’s SPT. U keeps the freedom to grant access to 
his SPT, and thus to the secret data, to the health 
professional P who is physically in front of him. 
He is guaranteed that nobody can access to his 
data without his awareness. On the other hand 
the durability of secret data is not guaranteed. 
o Resilient secret data: it is the secret data 
replicated on the central server in an encrypted 
format using encryption keys exclusively known 
by U’s SPT. The server maintains the durability 
of these data like regular data but U keeps the 
guarantee that nobody can access to them (i.e., in 
plain-text) without holding U’s SPT. U is just in 
charge of the durability of the encryption keys 
(e.g., thanks to a passphrase). 
o Confined data: it is the data that U wants to share 
in an exclusive manner among a reduced circle 
of trusted persons, with the guarantee that 
nobody else can access to the data. To do this, U 
puts encrypted data on the central server via his 
SPT, and shares these keys with the SPTs of the 
trusted circle. 
Finally, the data replication between central server 
and embedded server raises the tricky problem of 
synchronization. When two servers are connected 
with each other, the synchronization is done 
traditionally. However, this situation may never occur 
(e.g. a patient U may never leave home). In this 
particular case, a synchronization protocol using 
proxy will take place, in which the SPTs of health 
professionals in touch with U are used to carry 
encrypted messages between the central and the 
embedded server, similarly to a – slow – network. 
 
2.2. Sharing scenarios 
Let us illustrate the behavior of the system 
through scenarios involving three participants: an 
elderly patient named Bob, his family doctor Jim, and 
a nurse Lucy. Every participant owns an SPT. Several 
medical examinations are prescribed to Bob who 
designates a subset of them as confined (the others 
being considered as regular). The medical lab 
performing the examination pushes the results on the 
central server. Results corresponding to confined data 
are crypto-protected using Bob's public key2 before 
being pushed. 
Lucy frequently visits Bob at home. Bob has no 
internet connection and leaves home seldom. Thus, 
Lucy acts as a synchronization means for Bob’s 
folder (as any other person visiting Bob and owning 
an SPT). Before the visit, Lucy downloads from the 
central server only the latest updates, either confined 
or regular, performed in Bob’s folder. This includes 
the recent examination results. During the visit, 
Lucy's and Bob's SPTs are synchronized. The latest 
updates from the central server are integrated in 
Bob’s local folder. Conversely, the latest updates 
                                                        
2 Bob's public key is delivered by a PKI server while Bob's private 
key is replicated on every SPT belonging to Bob's trusted circle. 
The management of private keys is under the control of the secure 
chip and even the SPT holder cannot interfere or tamper it. For the 
sake of conciseness, we do not detail further the key exchange 
protocol among SPT. For efficiency, asymmetric encryption is used 
only to encrypt symmetric keys used to protect the confined data. 
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performed in Bob’s local folder, if any, are loaded on 
Lucy's SPT. This allows refreshing the central server 
replica the next time Lucy connects to the server. If 
Lucy does not belong to Bob's trusted circle, she 
cannot get access to the carried confined data nor to 
the unauthorized regular data, because (i) her SPT 
does not own Bob's private key, and (ii) the access 
control module embedded in the SPT regulates access 
to the regular data. 
Jim participates in Bob’s trusted circle. At his 
office, he can connect to the central server and view 
Bob’s up-to-date folder, including the results of the 
recent examinations and possible updates carried 
back by Lucy. When visiting Bob at home, he can get 
the same level of information by connecting locally 
to Bob's SPT.  
As a conclusion, any authorized people can 
connect to the central server or to an SPT local server 
and retrieve the regular data he is granted access to 
by the access control policy. No people outside the 
trusted circle can get access to the confined data. 
Nobody except the SPT owner can access his own 
secret data or resilient secret data. These confined 
and resilient secret data are protected against any 
form of attacks. Confined and resilient secret data are 
crypto-protected on the central server and attacks on 
the SPT are made extremely difficult by the tamper-
resistance of the chip and by the fact that the DBMS 
is self-administered. 
 
3. Functional architecture 
Figure 1 represents the functional architecture of 
SMSF which distinguishes infrastructure, data and 
software aspects. At the software layer, the shaded 
components are commercial software components 
(Web server, Web browser, relational DBMS, operating 
system), while the other components are designed and 
implemented particularly for the SMSF project. 
 
3.1. Infrastructure 
The infrastructure part in Figure 1 (from left to 
right) represents the central server hosting the 
personal folders, a user P who is connected through a 
laptop and potentially having downloaded part of the 
database (to use it in a disconnected mode), and a 
user U synchronizing his SPT on a PDA thanks to the 
updates transmitted by P’s SPT. 
The connection of users to the server is done 
through a secure TLS (Transport Layer Security) 
channel which guarantees the security of the 
communication. A strong mutual authentication 
occurs thanks to the certificates embedded in each 
SPT. 
The server provides a web interface to consult, 
create and synchronize data in a personal folder 
through a web browser. All these actions are done 
through the secure channel mentioned above. 
This infrastructure is based on classical hardware 
except the SPT.  
 
3.2. Data 
The data part in Figure 1 shows the different 
kinds of data and their encryption format in each 
environment, according to their status. The central 
server stores administration data such as the users’ 
certificates and their public keys. The server also 
stores secret keys (k) which are encrypted by using 
the public keys of the users belonging to the same 
trusted circle. Then, the central server stores, for each 
healthcare folder, the Regular Data (protected by the 
security procedures enforced by the database service 
provider), the resilient secret data encrypted with one 
(or more) secret keys kU known only by U’s SPT, the 
confined data encrypted with one (or more) secret 
keys k. The user P’s terminal can host the data to 
make them reachable in disconnected mode. These 
data are encrypted by using one (or more) secret keys 
kp known only by P’s SPT. Finally, an SPT hosts 
different kinds of data depending on whether it is 
used (1) as a user SPT to deal with a personal folder 
or (2) as a professional SPT to access a user’s folder 
(note that the two roles may be played at the same 
time). In the first case (a user dealing with his own 
folder), the SPT hosts administrative data such as the 
user’s certificate, his private key (the counterpart of 
his public key hosted by the central server), a set of 
secret keys kU used to encrypt the resilient secret data 
on the central server, a set of secret keys k used to 
encrypt confined data. These administrative data are 
stored in the secured microcontroller’s internal NOR 
Flash so that they are protected against physical 
attacks. The folder data, whatever their status are 
stored in the external NAND Flash (not hardware 
protected) and encrypted by using secret keys of type 
kU. In the second case (a professional dealing with 
the folder of another user), the SPT must be able to 
serve as a communication channel between the 
central server and the folder it deals with. To do that, 
the SPT has to transmit into NAND Flash the 
recently updated data (Delta data) encrypted with one 
(or more) secret keys kD, which are part of the 
administrative data carried by the SPT. 
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Figure 1: Functional architecture 
 
4. Embedded database server 
 
4.1. Functionalities 
For the sake of conciseness, this section 
concentrates on the embedded database server, because 
this is the software component introducing the most 
challenging technical issues.  
To manage secured and nomad folders, the SPT 
carries a full-fledged DBMS engine. This embedded 
DBMS: stores personal data on the external NAND 
Flash, builds and maintains indexes to make searches 
efficient, guarantees the atomicity of the update 
operations, evaluates SQL-like queries, has 
sophisticated access control enforcement (based on 
assertions, for example, only data satisfying assertion 
Q1 can be accessed by users satisfying assertion Q2). 
The access control mechanism is embedded in the 
secure microcontroller to be protected against any form 
of tampering (e.g., even if the folder is accessed 
through a spyware or virus prone terminal). The access 
control mechanism uses the query manager to evaluate 
the access control rules’ predicates, and the query 
manager uses in turn the storage and index manager. 
Hence, the complete DBMS is embedded in the secure 
chip [10]. Unlike traditional smart cards storage 
memory, NAND Flash memory used by the SPT is not 
hardware protected against attacks and therefore must 
be protected by using cryptographic methods. These 
methods (encryption, hash, and version control) are 
used with a granularity and a cost which is compatible 
with the great number of random data accesses 
produced by the evaluation of database queries. 
Finally, the synchronization module is also 
embedded in the SPT to synchronize the embedded 
folder with the copy stored in the central server, either 
directly when the SPT is connected, or through another 
SPT which is used as a communication channel (see 
scenario described in Section 2.2). 
4.2. Technical challenges and solutions 
The SPT framework introduces important new 
challenges [2]. Among which, the most difficult one is 
managing large databases on Flash with little RAM. To 
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tackle the RAM constraint, we designed and 
implemented a massive indexing scheme. This massive 
indexing scheme allows processing complex queries 
(with selection, projection, join and aggregate 
operators) over a large quantity of data (Gigabytes) 
while consuming as little RAM as possible and still 
exhibiting acceptable performances. The idea 
presented in [1] is to combine in the same indexing 
model generalized join indices and multi-table 
selection indices in such as way that any combination 
of selection and join predicates can be evaluated by set 
operations over lists of sorted tuple identifiers. 
On the other hand, massive indexation causes a big 
problem in terms of Flash updates, due to the severe 
read/write constraints of NAND Flash (rewriting 
NAND Flash pages is a very costly operation). 
Therefore, we designed a structure which manages data 
and index keys sequentially so that the number of re-
writes can be minimized. The use of summarization 
structures (based on bloom filters) and vertical 
partitioning reduce the cost of index lookups.  These 
additional structures are also managed in sequence. A 
first implementation of this principle has been patented 
jointly by INRIA and Gemalto [11]. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The functional architecture presented in Section 4 
will be experimented in the context of a medical-social 
network providing medical care and social services at 
home for elderly people. The objectives pursued are (1) 
to re-establish a natural and powerful way of protecting 
and sharing highly sensitive information among trusted 
parties and (2) to build a shared medical-social folder 
providing the highest degree of availability, whatever 
the mode of operation (disconnected or not). 
This project, partly funded by the Yvelines district 
and by ANR, involves the following partners: INRIA 
(the French National Research Institute in Computer 
Sciences), University of Versailles, SANTEOS (a 
French EHR provider), Gemalto (the smart card world 
leader), ALDS (a home care association) and 
COGITEY (a clinic for elderly people).  
The design phase started in January 2007. A 
website dedicated to the SMSF project (DMSP) [12] 
provides detailed information about the project and the 
implemented prototype. The experimentation in the 
field will be conducted fall 2009. It should be 
conducted with a population of about 100 volunteer 
patients and 25 practitioners and social workers in the 
Yvelines district. 
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